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The purpose of this paper is to propose foundations for a theory of situation awareness 
based on the analysis of interactions between agents (i.e., both human and non-
human) in subsystems.  This approach may help promote a better understanding of 
technology-mediated interaction in systems, as well as helping in the formulation of 
hypotheses and predictions concerning distributed situation awareness.  It is proposed 
that agents within a system each hold their own situation awareness which may be 
very different from (although compatible with) other agents.  It is argued that we 
should not always hope for, or indeed want, sharing of this awareness, as different 
system agents have different purposes.  This view marks situation awareness as a 
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dynamic and collaborative process that binds agents together on tasks on a moment-
by-moment basis.  Implications of this viewpoint for development of a new theory of, 
and accompanying methodology for, distributed situation awareness are offered. 
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DISTRIBUTED VERSUS OVERLAPPING SITUATION AWARENESS  
 
In this paper we present a description of Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) that is 
system- oriented, rather than individual-oriented. We argue that this approach provides 
us with a means of examining SA in team working. Our aim is to develop measures of 
DSA that can support prediction of performance and inform the interpretation of 
observations made in the field, e.g., in terms of explaining possible mistakes, in terms 
of comparison of command and control across different organisations.  Researchers 
such as Hollnagel (1993) and Hancock (1997) have made convincing arguments for the 
system’s perspective in analysing human-machine interaction.  The hierarchical and 
heterarchical relationships and interactions between structures and functions at different 
levels have certainly served human factors researchers well in the past (Wilson & 
Corlett, 1995Rasmussen, 1986; Salvendy, 1997; Singleton, 1989; Meister, 1989; 
Vicente, 1999).  In a review of contemporary team teamwork research, Paris et al 
(2000) found that most theories, models and taxonomies comprise a tripartite input-
process-output approach from general systems theory.  This seems to be a useful 
distinction for the development of a predictive model.  Indeed the systems theoretic 
approach would enable different levels of description appropriate to the nature of the 
prediction being offered.  The systems framework offers the possibility of analysing 
interactions and relationships at many different levels and focusing of specific 
interactions within sub-systems.  Researchers have suggested that technical aspects of 
the system are part of the joint cognitive system (Hollnagel, 1993).  Research into trust 
and technology suggests that there are shared traits between interpersonal trust and 
technological trust (Muir, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996).  Ashleigh & Stanton (2001) 
have shown that those shared traits included emotive constructs (i.e., confidence, 
respect, commitment and teamwork), cognitive constructs (e.g., understanding, ability, 
and expectancy), and behavioural constructs (e.g., reliability, performance and 
communication).  The authors report that the people they interviewed did not 
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distinguish between human or non-human agents when using these constructs.  The 
idea of collaborative human and non-human SA agents seems to be a useful concept to 
carry forward into our theory.   
 
We assume that, in distributed team work, cognitive processes occur at a systems, 
rather than individual level. Thus, if one takes Endsley’s (1995) three-stage model of 
SA {perception, comprehension, projection – which maps directly onto the tripartite 
input-process-output systems approach}, it is possible to apply this to a ‘system’ as 
shown in table one. In this example, a handheld gas analyser is used to determine 
whether fumes from a chemical are at risky levels. Once a threshold has been 
exceeded, the fire-fighter carrying the device decides to evacuate the area. The 
Incident Commander, watching the fire-fighter, realises that there is a risk and orders 
the crew to return to vehicles. 
 
Table one1: DSA in a part of a fire fighting system 
Agent PERCEPTION COMPREHENSION PROJECTION 
Gas analyser Senses level of 
toxic gas 
Calculates current 
gas level and 
compares against 
threshold 
Indicates that gas 
level could be 
hazardous to 
health if exposure 
prolonged 
Fire-fighter #1 Reads level on 
meter 
Determines high 
level equates to risk 
to self 
Need to exit 
building 
Incident Commander Sees fire-
fighter pause 
in doorway 
Decides gas level 
presents risk to crew 
Switch to 
defensive 
response 
 
This is quite a simple example as it’s linear – output from the gas analyser is input for 
the fire-fighter and, to a certain extent the fire-fighter’s output is the Commander’s 
input - but is serves to illustrate two factors that are important to the approach 
developed in this paper. First, the ‘knowledge’ that underlies DSA is distributed 
across the system. Second, there is implicit communication of information rather than 
detailed exchange of mental models.  From the example in table one, we can claim 
that the gas analyser represents its readings through a display showing that thresholds 
have been exceeded.  Thus, as some of the significant factors that will influence 
individual cognitive performance will involve the representation, transformation and 
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manipulation of information, i.e., from perception to cognition to action, so too can 
the systems-level model address such factors.  Indeed, much of the work into 
distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1991, 1995; Flor and Hutchins, 1995; Perry, 2004) 
has specifically addressed the questions of representation, particularly in terms of the 
ways in which artefacts (and their use by people) can be used to represent information 
in ways that can support the ‘immediate’ extraction of meaning by people (cf. the 
theory of affordances, Norman, 1988), or can be used to embed complex 
manipulations into simple actions.   It must be emphasised at this point that the 
approach takes a systems view, rather than looking at individuals.  Therefore current 
conceptions of DSA do not take individual variables into account.  There are theories 
of SA that already do this very well, and the purpose of this paper is to focus attention 
at a higher level in the system. This does not mean that individual SA is dismissed; 
rather a systems analysis cannot be accounted for by summing independent individual 
analyses.   
 
These fundamental ideas of situation awareness distributed in a system lead us to 
propose a set of tenets that could form the basis of a theory (Stanton et al, 2004).  
These propositions are as follows: 
 
a.  SA held by human and non-human agents.  As table 1 shows, technological 
artefacts (as well as human operators) have some level of situation awareness (at least 
in the sense that they are holders of contextually-relevant information), in this case the 
presence of toxic gas. 
 
b.  Different agents have different views on the same scene.  As table one shows, the 
gas analyser, fire fighter and Incident Commander all have different views on the 
scene, as illustrated in their perception, comprehension and projection of the incident. 
 
c.  Whether or not one agent’s SA overlaps with that of another depends on their 
respective goals.  Although they are part of the same fire fighting system, the goal of 
the gas analyser is to detect the level of toxic gas in the environment, the goal of the 
fire fighter is to determine the level of risk present in the environment and the goal of 
the Incident Commander is to decide on the appropriate response for his/her crew.  In 
terms of Endsley’s model of SA it could be that the different agents are actually 
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representing different stages of SA, rather than microcosms of SA in themselves – the 
gas analyser perceiving, the fire-fighter comprehending, and the Incident Commander 
projecting 
 
d.  Communication between agents may be non-verbal behaviour, customs and 
practice (but this may pose problems for non-native system users).  For example, the  
Incident Commander takes the pause by the fire fighter in the doorway as a signal that 
there is something wrong. 
 
e.  SA holds loosely-coupled systems together.  The relationship between the gas 
analyser, fire fighter and Incident Commander is held together by the by their 
respective levels or stages of awareness on the presence of toxins in the environments 
and the most appropriate response. 
 
f.  One agent may compensate for degradation in SA in another agent.  For example 
one fire fire-fighter may be unaware of the level of toxins in the environment until he 
is informed by the gas analyser, another fire fire-fighter or the incident commander. 
 
The types of incident that we are exploring can be considered in terms of Klein’s 
(1989) notions of Naturalistic Decision Making, i.e., agents in the field are able to 
draw upon their experience and expertise to make rapid diagnosis and to perform 
effective actions in very limited timeframes. In a similar fashion, Smith and Hancock 
(1995) propose that, “SA is the up-to-the minute comprehension of task relevant 
information that enables appropriate decision making under stress.”  [Smith and 
Hancock (1995), p.59].  As our theory of SA operates at a systems level, it takes a 
different perspective to the individual and shared SA approaches.  We feel that the 
shared SA approach could misdirect attention to inappropriate aspects of the task, 
where as there are points in tasks where SA may overlap for brief periods in 
distributed team working.  Distributed SA requirements are not the same as shared SA 
requirements however.  Shared SA implies shared requirements and purposes whereas 
distributed SA implies different, but potentially compatible, requirements and 
purposes. 
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Our approach assumes, therefore, that DSA can be defined as activated knowledge for 
a specific task within a system.  This echoes the notion of Bell and Lyon (2000) that, 
“SA could be defined as knowledge (in working memory) about elements of the 
environment” [Bell and Lyon, 2000, p. 142]. Taking this notion into the realm of 
distributed cognition, therefore, allows us to propose that a situation requires the use 
of appropriate knowledge (held by individuals, captured by devices etc.) that relates to 
the state of the environment and those changes as the situation develops.  For the 
model presented in this paper, the ‘ownership’ of this knowledge is initially at the 
system, rather than individual level.  This notion could be further extend to include 
‘meta-SA’, where its knowledge of other agents’ knowledge is contained in the 
system, such that each agent could potentially know where to go when they need to 
find something out.   
 
CASE STUDY ON TYPE 23 FRIGATE OPERATIONS CONTROL ROOM AT 
HMS DRYAD 
In order to apply the ideas of DSA to command and control, we have spent time at 
HMS Dryad (which is the head quarters of the Royal Naval School of Maritime 
Operations, where there are a number of land-based operations control room 
simulators) collecting data on anti-air warfare, surface and sub-surface threat tasks.  
The EAST (Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork) methodology (see Walker et al, 
2005 in this issue for a more in-depth discussion of the approach) takes data from 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (Annett, 2005 – Annett et al (2000) have demonstrated 
how HTA can be used to capture the principle components of team work in an Anti-
Submarine Warfare task), direct observation of tasks, and debriefing interviews using 
the Critical Decision Method (Klein & Armstrong, 2005) to produce three main 
representations of a system: a social network, a task network and a knowledge 
network.  We believe that these networks offer different, but compatible, facets of 
systems representation.  At the highest level of representation the social network 
represents communication relations between people in the system (Houghton et al, 
2005).  In the interests of brevity, this representation will not be shown within the 
current paper.  At the next level down, the task network shows the relationship 
between goals of different agents in the system.  At the lowest level of representation 
is the knowledge network, which shows the relationship between classes of 
information that the system knows about in order to perform effectively. 
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For the purposes of the HMS Dryad type 23 operations control room studies, an 
observer was able to sit directly behind a crew member and to plug into their console, 
allowing them to hear all radio exchanges.  The AAWO (Anti-Air Warfare Officer) 
was observed during the air threat and the PWO (Principal Warfare Officer) was 
observed during the subsurface and surface threats.  All forms of communication were 
recorded, including: verbal exchanges not communicated via radio, hand gestures, and 
written communication (on paper).  Figure one shows part of the type 23 operations 
room. 
 
Within these scenarios there are four main agents: the officer of the watch (OOW), 
the PWO, the AAWO, and the Captain. The OOW is an officer on the ship’s bridge 
who maintains the visual lookout and controls the ship.  The OOW can overrule the 
manoeuvring orders from the operations room should he consider them to be 
dangerous.  The PWO is responsible in the tactical handling of the ship and the 
integrated use of its weapons systems and sensors.  The PWO will take a tactical 
command role in multi threat missions.  The AAWO is responsible for plan of 
defence in response to an air attack.   The Captain will oversee the operations room.  
In addition to personnel the ship has a computer based command system which can 
communicate and control weapons and sensor systems which allow information to be 
passed independently of the command system itself.  An illustration of the seating 
layout and accompanying glossary are in figure two and table one two respectively. 
 
Originally the type 23 frigates primary task was of anti-submarine warfare.  More 
recently their role includes air and surface warfare.  All three scenarios fit into similar 
task models. In order to manage this scenario, a number of goals need to be 
addressed: plan resources and strategy, control external resources, posture platform 
for attack, identify and classify targets, assess threat and allocate targets, engage 
targets and re-allocate assets and weapons.   
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Figure 1. Illustration of workstations onboard a Type 23 frigate showing a subset 
of picture compilers. 
 
 
SPC    Forward 
SPS     
TPS   ASWD  
APS   ASWPS  
HC   PWO  
AcPC  *AAWO Captain  
     
  EWD MD GUN 
CONTROL 
Figure 2.  Seating lay out of Type 23 frigate operations room  
*denotes where the AAWO was standing 
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Table 2. The main agents involved in the mission 
Agent Title or 
Acronym 
Explanation of Acronym 
Captain  
PWO Principal Warfare Officer 
AAWO Anti Air Warfare Officer 
ASWPS Anti-Submarine Picture Supervisor 
SPC Surface Picture Controller 
EWD Electronic Warfare Director 
MD Missile Director  
HC Helicopter Controller 
APS Air Picture Supervisor 
Off Ship Other ships, aircraft etc 
Duty Staff  
OOW Officer Of the Watch 
ASWD Anti Submarine Warfare Director 
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare Officer 
SPS/ Surface Surface Picture Supervisor 
Harpoon  
CY Communication Yeoman 
AcPS Action Picture Supervisor 
 
 
The task model shown in figure three, illustrates the relationship between these goals.
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Control 
external 
resources 
Identify and 
classify targets 
Posture 
platform for 
attack 
 
Assess threat 
and allocate 
targets
Engage targets 
 
 
Re-allocate 
assets and 
weapons to new 
targets 
 
 
Plan resources 
and strategy 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the task network representation for a Type 23 frigate 
 
Before the mission, the planning of resources and strategy are undertaken.  During the 
mission the central tasks are performed concurrently by different parts of the team.  
New targets are identified and classified by the picture compilers and picture 
supervisors.  The targets are then assessed and prioritised by the AAWO and PWO, 
who allocate assets and weapon systems to the high priority threats.  The targets are 
then engaged by the assets and weapon systems as appropriate, and the degree of 
success is assessed.  Successfully damaging or deterring a target frees up the asset or 
weapon system for new allocation.  Missed targets may require reallocation.  At the 
same time as all of this activity is being undertaken, the platform is being postured to 
optimise the engagement or the ability to evade enemy weapons.  There is also a 
requirement to coordinate with other platforms and control other external resources 
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(such as fighters and helicopters).  Thus the whole operation demands considerable 
coordination of both internal (to the platform) and external resources and assets to 
manage a mission and deal with threats. 
 
The majority of communications onboard the type 23 frigate are verbal, via the radio 
circuits.  The PWO and AAWO have access to 20 external circuits, of which there are 
four major nets.  Internally there is one main ‘open line’ with up to 40 point to point 
interphones.  This method of communication has interesting implications for DSA, 
and has proven advantages in other areas (e.g., ATC).  Although the personnel sit side-
by-side they communicate via headsets and microphones and their visual attention is focused 
on the displays in front of them.  For some tasks there may only be marginal advantage 
to be gained by the physical co-location of the team members as noted by Stanton et 
al (2002).  The common battle-space picture, however, is built on the status displays 
and screens in front of the AWO and PWO.  This makes co-location of these roles 
extremely important for a coordinated response.  The subsurface and surface battles 
are usually fought over one net while the air battle is usually fought over another.  
The command open line is used by the captain, the AAWO, PWO, OOW, ASW 
Director, Duty Staff, EW Director, Missile and Gun Director, Communications 
Yeoman, and on a part time basis the helicopter controller. In addition to these radio 
channels crew members spoke face to face and used hand written notes.  Pointing to 
the screens was also observed when matters need to be clarified.  
 
The deepest level of analysis and representation is provided is the knowledge 
network, which describes the things that the system has to attend to in different phases 
of activity.  The task network will be used to frame the knowledge network, to show 
knowledge network relevant to different goals of the system.  One of the advantages 
of defining network models is that it is then possible to consider the potential effects 
of changes in those networks.  For example, what would be the effects of changing 
the task, social or propositional networks?  Would DSA be improved, remain the 
same or be adversely affected?  Similar questions could be proposed with respect to 
mission effectiveness, workload, error rates, and timeliness of the systems response.  
Our initial studies have focuses on the modelling of contemporary system networks 
however, as illustrated in the following section. 
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DSA Methodology 
The DSA methodology comprises three main parts.  In the first part, the knowledge 
owned by each party in each phase of the operation is elicited. Critical Decision 
Method has been used for this task. The second part is to extract ‘knowledge objects’ 
from the Critical Decision Method.  Content Analysis has been used for this task.  The 
third and final part is to represent the relations between ‘knowledge objects’ and 
identify in which phase(s) they are activated.  Propositional Networks were used for 
this task, comprising ‘subject’, ‘relation’ and ‘object’ network structures of the 
knowledge required by the system to describe any given situation.  Further details on 
the procedure and examples of the results follow. 
 
Part 1: Elicit the knowledge owned by each party 
Flanagan (1954) developed an interviewing protocol that allowed him to investigate 
‘critical incidents’ in aviation. The technique employs a semi-structured interview to 
elicit key factors in accounts of incidents.  In Flanagan’s (1954) approach, the method 
was used as a vehicle for interviewing groups of respondents (as opposed to 
individuals). The interview could commence with a broad question, such as “Can you 
think of any incident or near-miss or event which happened to you, or a colleague, 
which could have resulted in an accident, given other circumstances?” (Kirwan, 1994, 
p.66). The idea is that respondents produce accounts of incidents that can then be 
discussed.  
 
In recent years, the study of decision-making in real-world situations has received a 
great deal of attention. While much of the work involves observation, there is also an 
emphasis on the use of interviews to collect information.  The Critical Decision 
Method (Klein, 1989) is a form of critical incident technique.  According to Klein 
(1989), “The CDM is a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set of cognitive 
probes to actual non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision 
making” [Klein, 1989, p. 464].  In this approach, the interview proceeds through a 
series of four stages: briefing and initial recall of incidents; identifying decision points 
in a specific incident; probing the decision points; checking. 
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The Critical Decision Method (CDM) makes use of information provided during 
observation of a scenario and from post-hoc discussions.  This information is elicited 
and structured using the probe questions defined by O’Hare et al. (2000), as shown in 
table 3. A subject matter expert was interviewed and CDM analyses were conducted 
for the air threat scenario, subsurface threat and surface threat scenario (only the first 
of these three scenarios is presented here due to space limitations).  
 
Table 3. CDM probes (O’Hare et al 2000) 
Goal Specification What were your specific goals at the various decision points? 
Cue Identification What features were you looking for when you formulated your decision? 
How did you know  that you needed to make the decision? 
How did you know when to make the decision? 
Expectancy Were you expecting to make this sort of decision during the course of the 
event? 
Describe how this affected your decision making process. 
Conceptual Are there any situations in which your decision would have turned out 
differently? 
Describe the nature of these situations and the characteristics that would have 
changed the outcome of your decision. 
Influence of 
uncertainty 
At any stage, were you uncertain about either the reliability of the relevance 
of the information that you had available? 
At any stage, were you uncertain about the appropriateness of the decision? 
Information integration What was the most important piece of information that you used to formulate 
the decision? 
Situation Awareness What information did you have available to you at the time of the decision? 
Situation Assessment Did you use all of the information available to you when formulating the 
decision? 
Was there any additional information that you might have used to assist in 
the formulation of the decision? 
Options Were there any other alternatives available to you other than the decision you 
made? 
Decision blocking - 
stress  
Was their any stage during the decision making process in which you found 
it difficult to process and integrate the information available? 
Describe precisely the nature of the situation 
Basis of choice Do you think that you could develop a rule, based on your experience, which 
could assist another person to make the same decision successfully? 
Why/Why not? 
Analogy/generalisation Were you at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which a similar 
decision was made? 
Were you at any time, reminded of previous experiences in which a different 
decision was made? 
 
 
Part 2:  Extract ‘knowledge objects’ 
In order to convert the CDM tables into propositions, a Content Analysis is 
performed. In the first stage, this simply means separating all content words from any 
function words. For example, in response to one of the CDM probes the SME 
answered that the “Process is scripted but the situation determines the plan e.g. the 
nature of threat, degree of intelligence available, climatic conditions” would be 
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reduced to the following knowledge objects: ‘threat’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘weather’. 
Working through the table leads to a set of knowledge objects. These are checked to 
ensure that duplication is minimised and then used to construct the propositional 
network. 
 
In our interpretation of these activities we identify a network of knowledge objects.  
We have defined knowledge objects as the entities in the world that people detect, 
classify and manipulate.  For example, knowledge objects would comprise knowledge 
of own and enemy land, air and sea assets (and the capabilities of these assets), 
targets, priorities, radar bandwidths, plan and strategies.  For every set of phenomenon 
in the world there are potential knowledge objects.  In this way we have interpreted 
the battle space as a network of knowledge objects rather than a technological 
network.  This is not to deny the importance of the technological network, but to state 
that it is the correct activation of the knowledge network that ensures the whole 
system performs effectively. 
 
The idea that ‘knowledge’ can be represented in the form of a network has been a 
major source of discussion of memory in cognitive psychology since the 1970s. 
Initially, researchers used Semantic Nets as a way of representing the association 
between items within a concept. Such an approach gave rise to theoretical insights 
such as spreading activation (Quillian, 1969; Collins and Loftus, 1975). The basic 
premise is that an item of knowledge will be easier to process if it has a high level of 
activation. According to Collins and Loftus (1975), other nodes linked to this active 
node also become activated, i.e., “The spread of activation constantly expands, first to 
all the nodes linked to the first node, then to all the nodes linked to each of these 
nodes, and so on” [Collins and Loftus, 1975, p. 408].  One way of considering a 
semantic network is that it is like the ‘concept mapping’ idea, i.e., one writes a single 
word in a box and then creates more boxes that link to this initial word. 
 
Part 3:  Represent the relations between ‘knowledge objects’ and their activation 
Propositional Networks are like semantic networks in that they contain nodes (with 
words) and links between nodes, but differ in two ways.  First, the words are not 
necessarily randomly added to the network but involve the definition of propositions. 
A proposition is a basic statement, i.e., “..the smallest unit about which it makes sense 
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to make the judgement true or false” [Anderson, 1980, p.102].  Second, the links 
between words are labelled to define the relationship between propositions.  These 
relations might be in terms of subject and object (in grammatical terms), with a 
corresponding relation term.  On the basis of such descriptions, it is possible to claim 
that one can produce dictionary-like definitions of concepts through the application of 
basic propositions and operators (Ogden, 1987). 
 
From the propositions derived through content analysis from the CDM tables, it is 
possible to construct an initial propositional network to show the knowledge that is 
related to this incident.  The propositional network consists on a set of nodes that 
represent objects, e.g., sources of information, agents, etc. that are linked through 
specific operators.  From this network, it should be possible to identify required 
information and possible options relevant to this incident. 
 
In the initial descriptions, the operators are simple relations such as ‘causes’, ‘knows’, 
‘has’ ‘is’. Thus, the example knowledge objects, ‘platform’, ‘intent’, ‘weapons’ and 
‘threat’ would be represented as shown in figure six. 
infers 
relation 
subject object 
Platform Intent 
subject subject 
relation relation 
has 
object 
object subject 
Weapons Threat 
relation 
has 
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 Figure six.  A propositional network for command and control. 
 
The justification for using a propositional network in this manner is that it represents 
the ‘ideal’ collection of knowledge for a mission (and is probably best constructed 
post-hoc). As the incident unfolds, so participants will have access to more of this 
knowledge (either through communication with other agents or through recognising 
changes in the incident status). An advantage of producing such a diagram is that, 
through use of colour-coding, it is possible to indicate in a simple, visual manner the 
relationship between specific agents and specific objects over the course of a mission. 
As the mission unfolds, so different nodes in this network will become active. The 
active nodes might be relevant only to one or two agents within the system. For 
example, the situation described began with planning resources and strategy. This 
would cause the nodes relating to <intelligence>, <platform>, <intent>, <weapons>, 
<scenarios>, <threat> and <engage> to be active. As the mission progresses, so the 
activation of nodes alters.  Where there are jointly active nodes however, it is 
necessary to ensure some level of communication across agents. The knowledge 
network provides a graphical representation of the ideas and forms the basis for a 
distributed theory of situation awareness that is being developed from the work 
(Stanton et al., 2004). 
 
The complete knowledge network for the surface, sub-surface and air threat tasks is 
shown in figure 8 (this figure was created using the WESTT software (Houghton, 
Baber, and Cowton, 2005) for construction of propositional networks).  There are 
some sixty four knowledge objects in total which describe the total situation for the 
system under analysis.  The knowledge network makes no reference to any particular 
job roles, and technology is only referred to in a general sense (such as weapons, 
satellite, radar and sonar).  Whilst this is a general system-level representation, 
activation of any of the knowledge objects has been identified with particular tasks 
from the task network as shown in figures 9 to 15.  As described in the task network 
analysis, the knowledge network illustrated in figure 9 is performed prior to the 
mission and then the knowledge networks illustrated in figures 10 to 15 are performed 
concurrently by different parts of the team and technological system.  This activation 
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of the knowledge network illustrates the distributed situation awareness of the system 
in a very literal sense. 
 
Figure 9 shows the knowledge objects activated in the planning of resources and 
strategy.  Figure 10 shows the knowledge objects activated in the identification and 
classification of targets.  Figure 11 shows the knowledge objects activated in the 
assessment of threat and allocation of weapons and assets to targets.  Figure 12 shows 
the knowledge objects activated in the engagement of targets.  Figure 13 shows the 
knowledge objects activated in the reassessment of target engagement success and the 
reallocation of weapons and assets to new targets.  Figure 14 shows the knowledge 
objects activated in the control of external resources.  Figure 15 shows the knowledge 
objects activated in the posturing of the platform for attack.  These data are derived 
from the CDM’s and HTA as described earlier and were validated by Subject Matter 
Experts.  Analysis of the knowledge object activated by each phase was conducted 
and is presented after the figures. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Propositional network for air, surface and sub-surface threat tasks 
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Figure 9.  Propositional network for planning resources and strategy 
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Figure 10.  Propositional network for identifying and classifying targets 
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Figure 11.  Propositional network for assessing threat and allocating targets 
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Figure 12.  Propositional network for engaging targets 
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Figure 13.  Propositional network for re-assessing targets and allocating weapons to new targets 
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Figure 14.  Propositional network for controlling external resources 
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Figure 15.  Propositional network for posturing platform for attack
  
From this analysis, it is possible to identify the key knowledge objects that have 
salience to each phase of operation.  For the purpose of this analysis, salience is 
defined as those knowledge objects that serve as a central hub to other knowledge 
objects (i.e., have five or more links to other knowledge objects).  This criterion 
produces a list of twelve knowledge objects from a pool of sixty four (approximately 
one fifth of the total number of knowledge objects).  The objects are: intent, weapons, 
scenarios, threat, range, engage, radar, targets, status, intelligence, platform and hit 
potential.  The purpose of this analysis is to identify knowledge objects that play a 
central role in the threat tasks.  Each of these core knowledge objects is represented in 
a generic table against each stage for the purpose of highlighting its role. 
 
As table 3 shows, different core knowledge objects are salient at different points in 
the operation (e.g., intent is relevant at the plan, allocate, engage, reassess and posture 
phases, whereas intelligence is relevant only in the plan phase).  The passing of 
knowledge objects from one phase to another involves some manipulation of the 
object before it is passed and then means of communicating the nature of the object 
(for example the priority of targets are assessed before weapon systems are allocated 
to them and then they may be engaged), either implicitly or explicitly.   
 
Table 4.  Analysis of core knowledge objects within  the seven phases of operation 
Knowledge 
Objects 
Plan 
task 
Identify 
task 
Allocate 
task 
Engage 
task 
Reassess 
task 
Control 
task 
Posture 
task 
Intent        
Weapons        
Scenarios        
Threat        
Range        
Engage         
Radar        
Targets        
Status        
Intelligence        
Platform        
Hit potential        
Count of KOs 7/12 5/12 8/12 10/12 8/12 9/12 10/12 
 
The purpose of this analysis is that it brings all three representations together, namely 
the social network (i.e., whom is communicating with whom), the task network (i.e., 
the goals of what is being done) and the knowledge network (i.e., the key features of 
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 situation awareness for each phase of operation).  The HMS Dryad type 23 operations 
control room studies showed highly complex interaction between crew and 
communication channels.  It is an extremely intense environment and over a relatively 
short period of time (approximately two hours) an enormous amount of 
communications occurred with information being transferred.   
 
The methods indicate that there is a lot of teamwork occurring in each scenario 
although there is a clear hierarchy.  The PWO and AAWO still remain the central 
nodes of the operations room.  Information is shared between the crew members 
however the majority of this information seems to be shared via the PWO and 
AAWO.  
 
Shared awareness can be seen from the analysis in table four. Many of the knowledge 
objects are shared within the three individual scenarios (i.e., air, surface and sub-
surface) as well as across the whole mission. It is important to remember that the three 
scenarios observed will often happen at the same time and will not be separated into 
three clear areas.  Thus the sharing of knowledge objects across scenarios will be 
essential for effective operations.  
  
There is the implication that distributed situation awareness could be viewed in terms 
of the activated knowledge objects, and these activations change over the course or 
phases of a mission.  This has implications for workload and levels of uncertainty.  
We speculate that the workload and uncertainty might increase with the number of 
knowledge objects that need to be managed.  Workload might simply increase 
because there is more knowledge to manage whereas uncertainty might increase 
because there are more things to keep track of.   This hypothesis requires further 
empirical investigation.  The results of this application of the methodology are 
intended to form a part of wider data collection and analysis with a view to 
developing a generic model of command and control.   
 
Now that the network models have been defined, it should be possible to consider the 
potential effects of changes in those networks.  As mentioned in the introduction to 
this paper, these questions include addressing the effects of changing the task, social 
or propositional networks and the subsequent effects on DSA, workload, error rates, 
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 timeliness of response, and overall mission effectiveness.  This will be the focus of 
our subsequent research. 
 
Conclusions 
The idea that there exists a network of knowledge objects for the entire system raises 
some interesting points about shared awareness.  First, we claim that it the system as a 
whole, rather than a given individual, that holds all relevant knowledge; individuals 
have different views of this network. Second, the view that an individual has must be 
sufficient to support the activity that they perform, i.e., command activity requires 
high-level awareness of a wide range of knowledge objects, whereas target tracking 
requires low-level, detailed awareness of a subset of knowledge objects. Third, the 
‘sharing’ of awareness does not necessarily entail communication between individuals 
– it might be confusing or misleading if all individuals attempted to share all of their 
separate views of the situation. Rather, it is important for the agents within a system 
to have awareness of who is likely to hold specific views and, consequently, to 
interpret that potential usefulness of information that can be passed through the 
network in terms of these views.  Extending the DSA to Endsley’s conception of SA 
would mean that some individuals are engaged in perception tasks (such as the picture 
compilers and picture supervisors), some are engaged in comprehension and in the 
projection tasks (such as the anti-air warfare officer and the principle warfare officer) 
and other are engaged in the response execution tasks (such as the missile directors 
and the electronic warfare director).  Thus, referring back to the DSA analysis of the 
fire-fighting system, we argue that the theory and method work equally well with 
single person-machine systems as well as large multi-person machine systems, as 
DSA is concerned with how knowledge is used and parsed between agents in systems 
interaction. 
 
Indeed, this latter point may even hold the key to DSA.  Assuming that performance 
will be most effective when there is ‘good’ DSA throughout the system as a whole, it 
follows that the network links are more crucial than the nodes themselves in 
maintaining DSA.  Moreover, there are then two aspects of SA at any given node: 
individual SA of one’s own task, and a ‘meta-SA’ of the whole system’s DSA.  Given 
that effective team working depends on information transfer across the network links, 
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 knowing which links to use (and where to offer information when needed) will really 
determine the quality of DSA, and is thus perhaps the truest description of DSA itself. 
The Distributed Cognition approach has been successfully used to analyse the 
cognitive properties of a variety of environments (Perry, 2003), adding to our 
understanding of the cognitive processes that are taking place, over and above 
information gleaned from studies concentrating solely on individual cognition (Flor 
and Hutchins, 1991). It has also highlighted a new level of study for other research 
areas, including DSA.  The DSA approach does not dispute that the individuals in the 
system will have their own awareness of a situation, or that groups of individuals may 
share some level of understanding of the situation (Artman and Garbis, 1998).  It is 
asserted that complex problem-solving systems will have their own cognitive 
properties (including SA) that cannot be accounted for by individual cognition and 
that to study a system at the level of the individual will fail to pick up on these 
systems level features (Hutchins, 1995; Perry, 2003).   
 
The knowledge and task networks described in figures 8 to 15 are based on 
observational data and provide us with model exemplars of DSA for specific tasks in 
this environment.  These could then be used to diagnose problems in system 
performance where such problems are attributed to failures in DSA.  Taking the 
models one step further, it may even be possible to use the networks in a predictive 
fashion to run simulations of different task structures.  The DSA approach therefore 
has implications for the design of the working environment, e.g. in terms of team 
structure, which can impact the flow of information through the system; and HCI, due 
to the importance of technological artefacts in distributed environments (Artman, 
2000).   
 
By viewing SA first as a systems-level phenomenon, it is possible to identify the 
aspects of a situation about which agents require knowledge. By viewing the active 
knowledge in each state of an incident, it is possible to determine who knows what at 
a given time. From this perspective, it becomes possible to indicate how information 
needs to disseminate through the system for effective performance and to identify 
possible barriers to effective dissemination.  One of the keys to effective DSA are 
links, since you can’t have DSA without communication.  The graphical 
representation provides a simple but effective means by which system SA can be 
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 mapped.  From this work we further propose that adding additional communications 
requirements (through which agents share or communicate their mental models) can 
add significant burden to the processes and may actually impede SA by: (i.) 
introducing tasks that might serve to activate additional but unnecessary nodes in the 
network; (ii.) introduce time-delay between receiving and acting upon information; 
(iii.) inappropriate emphasis on some links in the network.  The challenge for now is 
to continue to collect evidence that will enable us to substantiate this theory.  In 
particular, our work focuses on the question of how best to describe SA at a system’s 
level and how communication between agents within a system can support effective 
performance. 
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